-Jim Root

As an organization that trumpets a decidedly pro-Brad Underwood stance, the Weave has collectively been underwhelmed by his performances in recent years (we’re not mad, we’re just disappointed). The issues have been particularly glaring on the defensive end, where his last three squads have finished 155th, 129th, and 108th in KenPom’s adjusted defensive efficiency. Underwood’s all-out blitzing strategy was consistently exposed by high-major ball-handlers, and while his teams were still generating turnovers, they were also getting destroyed at the rim and on the defensive glass while affording opponents all kinds of opportunities to get comfortable at the free throw line. He appeared to learn his lesson midway through his only Big 12 season, but for some reason, he resurrected his frenetic approach once he arrived in the Big Ten less than a year later. The results continued to be poor, twice ranking 11th in the B1G in conference-only defense (per KenPom) and failing to finish over .500 in either season (overall or in league play).

It’s not totally an issue of philosophy, though; after all, the most famous example of successful pressure in high-major hoops is Brad Underwood’s mentor, Bob Huggins, and his Press Virginia squads. Other coaches like Rick Pitino and Frank Martin (another Huggy Bear disciple) have had success at the highest level while emphasizing takeaways, as well. The problem was always more in execution of that goal and the questionable marriage of such a scheme to the personnel at hand. Even Huggins has had to drastically cut down his Press Virginia ways over the last two years without the kind of defensive anticipation and quickness needed to make it work consistently.

This season, though, Underwood and his staff have made a sweeping philosophy change. For fans of Mr. Pomeroy’s website, you need look no further than the team’s Four Factors to see the drastic shift:

The Illini have reversed course from a defense with all of the telltale signs of overaggression — huge foul count, no discipline on the defensive glass, but a high turnover rate — to a far more conservative style that focuses on dominating the paint and forcing opponents to make tough twos — a scheme that maps far more logically onto the current roster.

Notably, the arrival of human monolith Kofi Cockburn in the paint has fundamentally changed the way Illinois can defend. Listed at 7’0, 290 pounds, Cockburn is one of the largest players in college basketball, and while he’s not a springy shot-blocker, his immense size frequently alters opponents’ ability to finish at the rim. Perhaps more importantly, though, his presence often deters drivers altogether, influencing them to shoot hurried floaters or inefficient midrange jumpers over his outstretched arms:

As those clips suggest, foes simply don’t want to challenge the Jamaican mountain, and that has clearly aided in the Illini defense’s shot distribution allowed, pushing opponents out away from the rim:

That 12.4% decrease in shots at the rim is the second-largest dip in the entire country (everyone’s favorite Sharks, LIU, ranks first at 12.7%).

That’s not the only tactic that’s impacting shot selection, though. The Illinois perimeter players are no longer flying around trying to trap and produce steals, and that has led to fewer open driving lanes; we often derisively referred to Illinois’ defense in recent years as a lay-up line. Jordan Sperber recently wrote about year-over-year shot selection changes on offense (check out his Hoop Vision Plus), and if I’ve caught on to any trends from his excellent work, it’s that a similar defensive analysis is forthcoming – and I’d expect Illinois to rank quite highly.

The introduction of Cockburn to the lineup posed a difficult question. He could theoretically allow the Illini perimeter players to pressure even more, funneling foes into the waiting abyss in the paint, but that left sophomore big man Giorgi Bezhanishvili in limbo. The Georgian national is an excellent basketball player, but asking him to extend on the perimeter against wings and forwards would be like asking a DMV employee to expedite your request. This would have undermined Underwood’s pressure, so the third-year coach shifted all the way to the other end of the spectrum, deciding to remove the gambling from his system and instead play more soundly.

It has worked beautifully, with the new approach allowing the two big men to thrive together on both ends of the court (although I’ll ignore the offense for now, as that’s an entirely different article). The Hoop Lens on/off numbers support this, and the low turnover rate is more than offset by the team’s vastly improved 2P% defense and consistently elite defensive rebounding:

Clearly, the approach is less effective with Bezhanishvili as the back-end anchor, and the turnover rate changes suggest Underwood gives his team more freedom to hunt steals when Cockburn is off the floor.

Aside from the colossal impact Cockburn has had on the Illini defense, Underwood has also made a few other significant alterations to his scheme that have had hugely positive effects. His old approach was incredibly denial-heavy, especially one-pass away. This means being in the passing lane, denying ball rotation rather than sagging off and being there to help on drives. Here’s an obvious example from last year’s Big Ten Tournament:

Aaron Jordan (#23) is taking away his man as a passing option, but the result is a straight-line drive opportunity for Northwestern’s Ryan Taylor (#14) as he comes around a ball screen. This year, Underwood has his guards in much more of a gap alignment, sagging off into driving lanes when not guarding the ball:

It’s not like Kipper Nichols (circled) is sagging because he’s covering a non-shooter, either: he’s matched up with Isaiah Livers, who is currently scorching the nets from three-point range to the tune of 50% on over five attempts per game. The scheme now prioritizes eliminating these driving lanes and closing out hard on shooters, helping to prevent the “layup line” that we’ve seen in the past.

Another key change has simply been forcing opponents to execute more against a set defense. Per Synergy, opponents are finishing just 14.0% of possessions in transition this year, compared to 18.1% last year. Hoop-Math defines transition chances differently, but it sees the same trend, with transition accounting for 21.5% of possessions this year, a significant decrease from 25.0% in 2018-19. It’s also worth noting that non-conference games always trend higher in terms of tempo and transition chances, so this decrease will almost certainly become more pronounced as the season progresses.

Part of this change is that Underwood has, as mentioned, stopped pressing. He didn’t go nuts with it in his first two seasons, extending full court 11.8% (75th-most nationally) and 10.1% (90th) of the time in 2018-19 and 2017-18, respectively, but he’s erased it completely this season. The Illini have pressed on just 1.2% of possessions, 305th in the country, and that has allowed them to get back into a set defense far more frequently.

With all of this said, it’s not like Illinois has rocketed to the top of defensive metrics. The Illini are 53rd on that end at KenPom, 55th at BartTorvik, and 47th at Haslametrics, so there’s work left to do. Still, the defense is finally good enough to make a real run at an NCAA Tournament bid, and the offense looks plenty capable of doing its part to make that happen, as well.

Wednesday night was a huge win for both Brad Underwood and the Illinois program, affirming that the third-year coach is continuing to move things forward and claiming a “top of the resume” kind of win upon which the team can now begin to build a legitimate NCAA profile. Three more nonconference games await before Big Ten play starts in earnest, and the Arch Rivalry game versus Missouri in St. Louis looms large as the last true chance at a needle-moving win outside of league play. The conference slate isn’t kind, either, opening 2020 with dates at Michigan State and at home against Purdue, but that also means its ripe with opportunities.

At the very least, the Orange Krush can feel confident in Cockburn, the behemoth freshman leading an improved defense, one that will give the Illini a far greater chance at competing in hostile environments – like when they should have won at Maryland (defense travels, as the saying goes). The best coaches tailor their approaches to the players they have, and Underwood finally showing that flexibility has opened up a new realm of possibilities for this Illinois squad.